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RECENT CASES
AUTOMOBILES ASSUMPTION OF RISK No LONGER A
DEFENSE IN WISCONSIN. - Plaintiff was injured in an auto-

mobile collision while riding as a guest in the defendant's
vehicle and sued to recover damages. Under a comparative
negligence statute the jury found the plaintiff fifteen per cent
negligent and that the plaintiff had assumed the risk of the
defendant's negligence. On this finding the trial court dismissed the complaint. On appeal the Wisconsin Supreme Court
held that assumption of risk was no longer a defense available
to the host in automobile host-guest cases and granted a new
trial. The decision reasoned that the policy judgment involved
in applying the doctrine to automobile cases was not valid
under present public policy. McConville v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 113 N.W.2nd 14 (Wis. 1962).
In most jurisdictions, in absence of a guest statute, a host
driver is bound to exercise reasonable and ordinary care for
the safety of a guest passenger.1 However, the doctrine of
assumption of risk, 2 when applied to automobile host-guest
cases, limited this duty.3 In the United States McKinney v.
Neil4 made the first reference to the doctrine of assumption of
risk in vehicle cases. 5 In time, assumption of risk was applied
to automobile host-guest cases.6 In adapting the doctrine to
such cases the courts, reasoning from the licensor-licensee
relationship found in property cases,7 held the guest to take
the automobile as he found it except as to latent defects known
only to the driver-owner." The guest assumed the risk of
injuries proximately caused by conditions of which he knew
1. See, e.g., Central Copper Co. v. Klefisch, 34 Ariz. 230, 270 Pac.
(1938); Lorance v. Smith, 173 La. 883, 138 So. 871 (1931).
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2. See generally White, The Liability of an Automobile IDriver to a
Non-Paying Passenger, 20 Va. L, Rev. 326 at 346-55 (1933) and Rice, The
Automobile Guest and the Rationale of Assumption of Risk. 27 Minn. L.
Rev. 323, 429 (1943) for a discussion of the doctrine of assumption of risk.
3. Roberson v. Roberson, 193 Ark. 669, 101 S.W.2d 961 (1937); 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 21.8, at 1191 (1956) "The doctrine of assumption
of risk however it is analyzdd and defined is in most of its aspects a defendant's doctrine which restricts liability ..
"
4. (C.C. Ohio), 1 McLean 540, Fed. Cas. No. 8865 (1840) "And every
passenger must make up his mind to meet the risks incident to the mode
of travel he adopts, which cannot be avoided."
5. See Rice, The Automobile Guest and the Rational of Assumption of
Risk, 27 Minn. L. Rev. 323, 429, at 327 (1943).
6. See, e.g., Beard v. Klusmeier, 158 Ky. 153, 164 S.W. 319 (1914); Patnode v. Foote, 153 App. Div. 494, 138 N.Y.S. 221 (1912).
7. See James, Assumption of Risk, 61 Yale L. J. 141, 157 (1952).
8.. Shrigley v. Pierson, 189 Ark. 386, 72 S.W.2d 541 (1934); Olson v.
Buckley, 220 Minn. 155, 19 N.W.2d 57 (1945); PROSSER, TORTS, § 55, at
310 (2d ed. 1955).
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or should have known9 In justifying this reasoning it has been
said that if recovery was allowed for mere negligence, the,
host and guest might collude at the expense of the insurance
companiesO and a high degree of care required of the host
would discourage automobile owners from extending their
hospitality to guests.With the increasing usage of automobiles the legislatures
of many states enacted guest statutes 12 with the purpose of
limiting the recovery of a guest. 3 These statutes allowed recovery only in the event of gross negligence, wilful misconduct
or intoxication on the part of the host.1 4 Under these statutes,
however, if it could be shown that the guest had assumed the
15
risk, recovery would be barred.
Assumption of risk has been held to be a defense separate
from contributory negligence. 6 The doctrine of assumption of
risk is important to the defendant host because many states
do not recognize contributory negligence as a defense under
17
their guest statutes.
In North Dakota the defenses of contributory negligence
and assumption of risk are both available to the host driver.'s
Only in the event of the host-driver's wilful misconduct does
it appear that a defense of contributory negligence would be
denied and then only if the alleged contributory negligence
was an inducing factor to wilful misconduct. 9 It is submitted
that assumption of risk is not as important in North Dakota
9. Valencia v. Jan Jose Scavenger Co., 21 Cal. App. 2d 469, 69 P.2d 480
(1937); White v. McVicker, 216 Iowa 90, 246 N.W. 385 (1933); Nardone v.
Milton Fire Dist., 261 App. Div. 717, 27 N.Y.S. 2d 489 (1941).
10. Naudzius v. Lahr, 253 Mich. 216, 234 N.W. 581 (1931).
11. Heesacker v. Boisted, 131 Neb. 42, 267 N.W. 177 (1936).
12. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann., tit, 21 § 6101 (1953), Iowa Code Ann., §
321.494 (1949).
13. Neesen v. Armstrong, 213 Iowa 378, 239 N.W. 56 (1931) "Our statute
section 5026 b-i, Code 1931, was enacted for the very purpose of preventing recovery by a guest of damages resulting from the negligence of
the driver of the automobile."; White, The Liability of an Automobile
Driver to a Non-Paying Passenger, 20 Va. L. Rev. 326 (1933).
14. E.g.. N.D. Cent. Code ch. 39-15 (1961); For a general discussion of
these statutes, see Weber, Guest Statutes, 11 U. Cinc. L. Rev. 24 (1937).
15. White v. MeVicker, 216 Iowa 90, 246 N.W. 385 (1933); Borstad v.
LaRoque, 98 N.W.2d 16 (N.D. 1959).
16. Pierce v. Clemens, 113 Ind. App. 65, 46 N.E.2d 836 (1934).
17. Coconower v. Stoddard, 96 Ind. App. 287, 182 N.E. 466 (1932); Neesen
v. Armstrong, 213 Iowa 378, 239 N.W. 56 (1931); Gill v. Arthur, 69 Ohio App.
386, 43 N.E.2d 894 (1941).
18. Borstad v. LaRoque, 98 N.W.2d 16 (N.D. 1959); Ledford v. Klein, 87
N.W.2d 345 (N.D. 1957).
19. Ledford v. Klein 87 N.W.2d 245 (N.D. 1957).
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as it is in states not recognizing contributory negligence as
a defense to guest statutes.
Wisconsin's rejection of assumption of risk as a defense
in host-guest cases is a radical departure from widely accepted
principles. The court in the instant case justified its holding
by noting the modern prevalence of liability insurance and the
desirability of shifting the burden of injuries from the
individual to the motoring public. Such arguments involve
value judgments.
It is hard to justify the rule of assumption of risk because
it prevents the automobile guest from recovering for negligence which in other situations would clearly allow recovery.
20
Such a rule has led to workmen's compensation laws.
Similiar proposals have been made regarding automobile legis21
lation.
R. LEE HAMILTON
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Plaintiff purchased materials in

Utah to be used on a construction job in Oregon. The contract
of sale and the bill of lading called for an out-of-state shipment, and the purchase price included freight rates commensurate with common carrier's rates to the out-of-state destination. The nature of the order made it certain that the materials
could be consumed only in Oregon. Plaintiff accepted delivery
to himself in Utah and immediately transported the goods to
Oregon where they were consumed. The Utah Tax Commission
levied a sales tax on this transaction. The Supreme Court of
Utah held that this tax imposed a burden on interstate commerce and therefore was invalid. Pacific States Cast Iron Pipe
Co. v. States Tax Commission 13 Utah 2d 113, 369 P.2d 123
(1962).
Because

Congress has the exclusive

power to regulate

20. James, Assumption of RIsk, 61 Yale L. J. 141, 154 (1952).
21. See Corish, The Automobile Guest, 14 B. U. L. Rev. 729 at 750 (1934).
"One entrusted with the operation of an automobile upon the crowed highways

of today

should not be

clothed with immunity for

negligent

driv-

ing which results in injuries to the occupants of his machine. The social
interests to be protected demand that the rule be changed by legislative
function."

